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I.

UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME. WILSONS’ ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ARE
NOT CONVINCING.
In its opinion, after interpreting § 31A-21-108, the Utah Court of Appeals stated,

“Our review of Utah case law convinces us that . . . no independent right exists for an
insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own name.” Wilson v. Educators Mut. Ins.
Ass’n., 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. The court of appeals went on to hold Utah
law does not permit a subrogating insurer to file a subrogation action in its own name and
thus, EMIA’s claim should be dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. In its brief to the supreme court,
EMIA presented several subrogation cases in which an insurer did sue in its own name to
demonstrate that the court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 was incorrect and
that insurance companies do have a common law right to sue in their own names when
subrogating. Br. of Appellant (“EMIA’s Br.”) at 9–23. Wilsons argue the court of appeals
correctly interpreted § 31A-21-108, and then attempt to distinguish the cases presented
by EMIA by claiming the cases are exceptions to the general rule that a subrogating
insurer cannot sue in its own name. Br. of Appellee (“Wilsons’ Br.”) at 7–16.
While Wilsons’ position is untenable, even if the Wilsons are correct, their
position would support reversing the decision of the court of appeals. Wilsons
acknowledge that Utah law allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own
name in several instances, contrary to the court of appeals’ decision, but then claim these
instances are no more than exceptions. Id. Specifically, Wilsons argue Utah law has
established special rules allowing an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name
in the following four areas: (1) property damage cases; (2) when the insured has been
1

made whole; (3) worker’s compensation cases; and (4) when an insurer sues another
insurer. Id. Wilsons argue Utah law specifically limits an insurer’s right to bring
subrogation actions to cases where at least one of the above four categories are present.
This is not the case nor was it the rule articulated by the court of appeals. In reality,
rather than exceptions, the cases cited clearly illustrate and support the general
proposition that an insurer can bring a subrogation action in its own name and that the
court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 was incorrect. Each of the four
categories proposed by the Wilsons will be discussed in turn.
A.

UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME TO RECOUP MEDICAL EXPENSES.
Wilsons acknowledge Utah common law allows an insurer to bring a subrogation

action in its own name for property damage claims, but then argue that under Utah
common law, EMIA cannot subrogate to recoup medical expenses because those
expenses are associated with personal injury damages. Wilsons’ Br. at 8–9. Wilsons’
proposition is incorrect.
Wilsons wrongly cite to Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah
1944). Wilsons’ Br. at 8–9. As EMIA discussed in its Brief of Appellant, this particular
portion of Johanson cited by Wilsons was a review of other jurisdiction’s laws that the
Johanson Court expressly rejected. EMIA’s Br. at 17–20. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court has since specifically acknowledged an insurer’s right, under common
law, to bring a subrogation action for medical expenses in State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (“State Farm I”).
2

In State Farm I a similar argument as the Wilsons’ was raised. See State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 1002, 1002–03 (1972) (“State Farm II”)
(setting forth factual background and arguments raised in State Farm I). Specifically, the
tortfeasor’s insurer in State Farm I argued subrogation is a form of assignment and, under
common law, assignment of personal injury claims was not allowed, so therefore the
insurer could not bring its subrogation action. See State Farm I, 450 P.2d at 459. The
Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding an insurer has the right to bring
subrogation claims against a tortfeasor with respect to medical expenses according to the
insurer’s insurance policy with its insured. Id. It is also important to note the subrogating
insurer in State Farm I sued in its own name.
Similarly, in the present matter EMIA is seeking subrogation regarding the
medical expenses it paid in behalf of its insured. In accordance with State Farm I EMIA
has the right to file its action against the tortfeasor and do so in its own name. The
common law right to do so has been part of Utah law since at least 1969.
B.

THE MADE WHOLE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY.
Wilsons next claim a special rule that an insurer may not seek subrogation in its

own name unless the insurer has fully indemnified the insured for all damages for which
the wrongdoer could be held liable. Wilson’s Br. at 9–11. Wilsons have touched upon an
important rule, the made whole doctrine, but have altered the rule substantially by
claiming the rule dictates in whose name a subrogation claim must be brought. The made
whole doctrine does not dictate when an insurer can bring a subrogation action in its own
name. Rather, the made whole doctrine applies in equitable subrogation cases
3

(subrogation matters where the insurance policy does not set forth contractual terms
regarding subrogation) and creates rules for insurers seeking subrogation rights
irrespective of whose name the case is brought in.
Wilsons incorrectly argue that the Utah Supreme Court has held an insurer must
fully indemnify an insured before it can sue in its own name. Id. (citing State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996); Cook v. Cook, 174 P.2d
434 (Utah 1946); Featherstone v. Emerson, 45 Pac. 713 (Utah 1896); Davis Cnty. v.
Jensen, 2003 UT App 444, 83 P.3d 405). None of these cases address the issue of
whether or not an insurer can sue in its own name, rather, the cited cases are articulations
of the made whole doctrine and when it is applicable.1 Specifically, these cases cited by
Wilsons only articulate the rule that a party seeking equitable subrogation must fully
indemnify the injured party before seeking subrogation rights. Again, the principle of
equitable subrogation is void when the insurance policy dictates terms regarding
subrogation. Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)
disapproved of on separate grounds by Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931
P.2d 127 (Utah 1997).

1

In its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals cites to Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. for
the proposition that an insurer may be able to seek subrogation damages in its own name
if it has fully indemnified the insured. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. As
EMIA discussed in Brief of Appellant, this particular portion of Johanson cited by the
court of appeals was a review of other jurisdictions’ laws that was rejected by the
Johanson Court. Wilsons counter that the court of appeals was not relying on Johanson
for its holding, Wilsons’ Br. at 11–12, but rather cited Johanson for a good review of the
general law. Id. at 11. Regardless, the view was rejected by the Johanson Court and was
not addressed in the cases cited by Wilsons. Wilsons’ rule that in insurer can seek
subrogation rights only after fully indemnifying its insured is not Utah law.
4

The made whole doctrine is inapplicable in the present case. The Utah Supreme
Court has given clear instruction as to when principles of equitable subrogation and
contractual subrogation apply. In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between
equitable and contractual subrogation in Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,
765 P. 2d 864. The Utah Supreme Court stated, “[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine
and is governed by equitable principles. This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in
the absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the
insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor.” Id.
at 866 (emphasis added). See also Birch v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2005 UT App 395, ¶ 7, 122
P.3d 696 (“The subrogation doctrine can be modified by contract.”) In this matter, where
there is a contract with express terms to the contrary, equitable subrogation and the made
whole doctrine are inapplicable. See R. at 624–25 (setting forth contractual subrogation
terms). See generally R. at 605–85 (setting forth full insurance contract).
While it is clear the present case is based in contractual subrogation, and hence the
made whole doctrine does not apply, Wilsons do not attempt to apply the actual rule
articulated in the cases they cited. Rather, Wilsons seek to alter the made whole doctrine
to create a nonexistent rule restricting in whose name a subrogation action may be
brought.
C.
UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME, INCLUDING IN WORKERS COMPENSATION CASES.
Wilsons argue that a workers compensation insurer is entitled to bring an action in
its own name only because Utah Code allows them to do so. Wilsons’ Br. at 11–14.
5

While modern day statute does specifically allow this right, early workers compensation
statutes did not. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court relied on general common law
subrogation principles to determine that insurers in workers compensation cases could
bring a subrogation action in their own name. See Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 (“when . . .
no special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading.”).
Wilsons’ analysis of Johanson, an early workers compensation case, is incorrect.
Wilsons incorrectly claim that 42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933 (“42-1-58”), the statute giving a
workers compensation insurer a statutory right to subrogate at the time of the Johanson
case, was similar in substance to modern day workers compensation statutes in that it
expressly authorized a workers compensation insurer to bring a subrogation action in its
own name. Wilsons’ Br. at 12. However, Wilsons are incorrect.
42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933 reads in full as follows:
When any injury for which compensation is payable under this title shall
have been caused by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may at their option claim
compensation under this title or have their action for damages against such
third person; and, if compensation is claimed and awarded, the employer or
insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall be subrogated to the
rights of such employee or his dependents to recover against such third
person; provided, if such recovery shall be in excess of the amount of the
compensation awarded and paid, then such excess, less the reasonable
expenses of the action, shall be paid to the employee or his dependents.
42-1-58, R.S.U. 1933. See also Addend. A (supplying a copy of statute as it appeared in
the Revised Statutes of Utah (1933)). The statutory right afforded by 42-1-58 was the
6

right to subrogate. Unlike modern day workers compensation statutes, and contrary to
Wilsons’ assertions, 42-1-58 did not state in whose name the subrogation rights could be
pursued.
The Johanson Court recognized 42-1-58 did not prescribe the manner in which
such a subrogation action should be maintained. The Court noted, “when this right of
subrogation was given by statute as it is in Section 42-1-58 and no special rules for
maintaining the action are prescribed, the proceeding to enforce the rights gained by
subrogation will be controlled by general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes
governing pleading.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added). The Johanson Court held that under
Utah’s subrogation common law and Utah’s real party in interest statute, both the insured
and the insurer are real parties in interest, co-owner’s of the insured’s cause of action, and
both may maintain the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–05.
Those same general, common law subrogation principles apply today like they did
back in 1944. While early workers compensation insurers had a statutory right to
subrogate, their right to do so in their own name was granted by common law general
principles of subrogation.
D.
UTAH COMMON LAW ALLOWS AN INSURER TO BRING A SUBROGATION
ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME AGAINST BOTH A TORTFEASOR AND THE TORTFEASOR’S
INSURER.
Finally, Wilsons claim that Utah common law “carved out a special standing rule
allowing insurers to sue other insurers” in their own name. Wilsons’ Br. at 15 (claiming
the special rule was carved out by the Utah Supreme Court). There is no such special
standing rule. The cases cited by Wilsons do mark the articulation of an important
7

subrogation development in Utah law, but the development has nothing to do with in
whose name the subrogation action can be pursued. Rather, the development allowed
subrogating insurers to directly sue both the tortfeasor and/or the tortfeasor’s insurer.
Wilsons cite to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern
National Insurance Co. The full quote reads as follows:
Utah law clearly recognizes an insurer’s right to bring a subrogation action
on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor. More significantly, we have
extended this principle to an action by an insurer against a second insurance
company which is primarily liable to defend or pay any claims on behalf of
its insured but which has denied coverage.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996) (internal
citations omitted). The rule articulated in State Farm Mutual is that the subrogation rights
an insurer has against a tortfeasor can also be claimed against the tortfeasor’s insurer. The
rule does not grant an additional right for an insurer to sue another insurer in its own
name. An insurer could sue another insurer in its own name because an insurer already
had that right against the tortfeasor and that right was extended to the tortfeasor’s insurer.
The special standing rule, as articulated by Wilsons, simply does not exist.
II.

PROCEDURAL AND POLICY CONCERNS IN SUBROGATION ACTIONS.
The court of appeals stated EMIA had alternative routes available to protect

EMIA’s rights including pursuing its rights through probate and intervening in Wilsons’
cause of action. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471. Wilsons, however,
presented conflicting arguments. Wilsons first agreed with the Utah Court of Appeals that
EMIA had alternatives in either a probate proceeding or by intervening in the Wilsons’
cause of action. Wilsons’ Br. at 21–23. But Wilsons then argued that an insurer loses its
8

subrogation rights if an insured passes away, rearguing their arguments made below at
the court of appeals. Wilsons’ Br. at 21–23; see also Br. of Appellant at 17–18, Wilson,
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471 (arguing Utah’s survival statute prevents EMIA from
“stand[ing] in the shoes of a dead person.”). As The Utah Court of Appeals never reached
Wilson’s argument that an insurer’s rights are extinguished upon the death of their
insured, and that issue is not now before the Utah Supreme Court, EMIA will not address
that issue here. The issues of a probate proceeding and intervention are each addressed
below. EMIA will then briefly address Wilsons’ assertions as to the legislative intent
behind Utah’s subrogation statute.
First, the proposition that an insurer can pursue its rights through probate is
problematic. It is unclear if EMIA could have been a personal representative of Ms.
Wilson’s estate. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-203(1) (setting forth categories of persons
who can be personal representatives and priority of appointment; an insurer may not fit in
any of the prescribed categories unless it is a creditor). But, even if EMIA could be
viewed as a creditor, it would have had the lowest priority of appointment. Id. Most
likely, EMIA would be at the mercy of an individual with standing, or a higher priority of
appointment, to commence the administration of Ms. Wilson’s estate. As noted in
EMIA’s initial brief, see EMIA’s Br. at 24–25, this present case illustrates that the
interests of the family of the decedent and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A
personal representative or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer
if doing so would potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the
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family member to receive. Id. The probate option is really not available as a practical
matter.
Next, the intervention alternative is equally problematic. First, if an insurer cannot
instigate a subrogation action in cases such as this, but must wait to intervene in an heir’s
action, the insurer is at the mercy of the heirs to bring a cause of action before it may
protect its subrogation rights. This is at odds with the holding in Johanson that, as joint
real parties in interest and co-owners of the insured’s cause of action, both the insured
and insurer may bring the cause of action, and neither is precluded from pursuing the
cause of action just because the other party declined to do so. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–
05. Second, the very same arguments Wilsons made that EMIA does not have standing to
bring a subrogation case could likewise be raised if EMIA had sought to intervene. As a
practical matter, intervention does not insure an insurer’s subrogation rights are protected
because it may not be available.
There are questions about whether the intervention or probate routes articulated by
the Utah Court of Appeals could really have protected EMIA’s rights. Under either route,
EMIA could not enforce its subrogation rights without the cooperation of Wilsons. As
this case has shown, the Wilsons have been adverse to EMIA exercising its rights.
Dependence on the Wilsons is not necessary however, as Utah law already allows an
insurer to protect its subrogation rights in the manner followed by EMIA.
Finally, EMIA contests the policy articulation made by Wilsons. Without citation,
Wilson claim the “strong policy [of] § 31A-21-108 is to prevent the splitting of a cause of
action.” Wilsons’ Br. at 19. Wilsons’ provide no basis for this legislative intent assertion.
10

Like Amicus, see Br. of Amicus at 7–9, EMIA searched the legislative history behind
enactment of § 31A-21-108, Utah’s subrogation statute, but could not find a specific
articulation of the legislature’s intent in passing the statute. However, the intent of
passing such statutes on a national, state-by-state basis is well documented. The purpose
behind such statutes granting an insurer the right to bring a subrogation action in the
name of its insured is to prevent a jury from discovering that the insured’s loss may have
been covered by insurance. See Daniel W. Coffey, A Rose by Another Name? Use of the
Insured’s Name in Subrogation Actions, NASP SUBROGATOR, Spring/Summer (2004),
http://www.subrogation.org/download/article/A-Rose-By-Another-Name_Use-of-theInsureds-Name-in-Subrogation-Actions.pdf. EMIA recognizes that this national rationale
for the state-by-state push for such legislation is persuasive at best as to the Utah
legislature’s intent in passing § 31A-21-108. For this reason, EMIA has, to this point,
refrained from making such inferences. However, with Wilsons articulating a legislative
intent without citing any basis, it is important this Court know the policy reason behind a
national push for such legislation.
III.

RULE 17 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES.
As EMIA has argued previously, Rule 17 is applicable to this matter and

prevented the court of appeals from ordering EMIA’s matter be dismissed. Rule 17 states
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest.
11

U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added). Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion,
the Utah Court of Appeals stated, “We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a
subrogation action against Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court erred in dividing
the Wilsons’ settlement with EMIA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and
remand with instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s claims. . . .” Wilson, 2016
UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d 471. (emphasis added). EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation
action in its own name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue
governed by Rule 17, making dismissal inappropriate. While EMIA believes it was
proper to bring its subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not under the court
of appeals’ reasoning, EMIA would have had standing had it brought its subrogation
action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471
(“EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate or
intervened in the Wilsons’ action against Krueger.”). The court of appeals should not
have dismissed EMIA’s claims, even if the wrong party was named.
Despite the above, Wilsons argue Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
inapplicable to this matter for three reasons: first, EMIA’s case against the tortfeasor was
dismissed; second, the right to have the real party in interest substituted belonged to the
tortfeasor; and third, EMIA had a reasonable time to substitute the real party in interest.
See Wilsons’ Br. at 24–25. None of these positions are persuasive and each will be dealt
with in turn below.
A.
THE FACT THAT EMIA'S ACTION AGAINST THE TORTFEASOR WAS DISMISSED
IS INCONSEQUENTIAL.
12

Wilsons first challenge the applicability of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on the basis that EMIA’s action against the tortfeasor was dismissed. See
Wilsons’ Br. at 24. Wilsons are correct that after the claims filed by EMIA and the
Wilsons were consolidated, the parties stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor
from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor interpleading $100,000—the tortfeasor insurance
liability policy limit—with the trial court. R. at 543, 841. However, Wilsons’ arguments
as to the import of the above are confusing at best. Initially, it should be noted Wilsons
cite to no authority for their proposition. Wilsons then go on to assert, “EMIA has
standing in this interpleader case to litigate its right to the interpleader funds, but the
Court of Appeals directed the trial court to dismiss EMIA from the interpleader action
because it lacked standing in the case it filed against Krueger.” Wilsons’ Br. at 24.
Wilsons offer no explanation for the interesting proposition that it would have been
appropriate for EMIA to sue in its own name in conjunction with the interpleader portion
of the case, but not in the action dealing directly with the liability of the tortfeasor. Nor
was this particular distinction made by the court of appeals in its opinion.
B.
THE FACT THAT THE TORTFEASOR HAD THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
SUBSTITUTION OF THE ALLEGED REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND FAILED TO DO SO
DOES NOT ADVANCE WILSONS' POSITION.
Next, Wilsons argue Rule 17 is inapplicable because “the right to have the real
party in interest substituted into an action” belonged to the tortfeasor. Wilsons’ Br. at 24
(citing Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)). However, this fact
does little to improve Wilsons’ position. In Johanson, the Utah Supreme Court stated,
“The failure on the part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if
13

it refused to join, make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff.
Such a defect is waived unless raised.” 152 P.2d at 104–05. Clearly, failure to join the
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104–05. Under Johanson, if
the tortfeasor has been dismissed, it would appear that the issue of whether or not EMIA
could have brought the suit in its own name or not is waived and should not have served
as a basis for dismissing EMIA’s claims.
EMIA DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE TIME TO SUBSTITUTE THE REAL PARTY
IN INTEREST.
C.

Finally, Wilsons argue EMIA had more than enough time to substitute the real
party in interest. See Wilsons’ Brief at pg. 24–25. While EMIA believes it is the real
party in interest and was at all times, even if it were not, Wilsons’ proposition is
problematic. First, early on in the case, the tortfeasor attempted to dismiss EMIA’s
action for lack of standing. R. at 783–90. After oral argument, the trial court denied that
motion and ruled EMIA did indeed have standing to bring its subrogation action and
could properly do so in its own name. R. at 820–22. While EMIA believes and maintains
that the determination of the trial court regarding EMIA’s ability to bring an action in its
own name was correct, even if the trial court ruled incorrectly, Wilsons fault EMIA for
not unilaterally overruling the order of the trial court. To require a party to take such an
action is inappropriate and nonsensical. Further, Wilsons do not cite to any legal
authority for their assertion that such an action is required or appropriate.
Second, no party objected to EMIA being the real party in interest. Rule 17 states,
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed
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after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been
commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
U.R.C.P. 17(a) (emphasis added). While a motion to dismiss was filed challenging
EMIA’s standing to bring the action, no objection or motion was ever made pursuant to
Rule 17 arguing that EMIA was not the real party in interest.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision in this matter should
be reversed.

DATED this 9th day of December, 2016.
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